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Making decisions about the future is complex, not least because we can never be sure exactly what 
is going to happen. Historically, transport systems have experienced long periods of stability, 
punctuated by significant technological developments: the discovery of the wheel, the 
domestication of the horse, and the rapid succession of inventions in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
that led to the development of bicycles, trains, trams, subways, and then motor vehicles. We may be 
on the cusp of another disruptive round of change, and that leads to high levels of uncertainty about 
the future. We can choose to wait and see what happens, or we can plan to proactively shape our 
future as it emerges.  
This document results from a project exploring the implications of changing transport systems. It has 
a particular focus on autonomous vehicles (AVs) and their implications for the wellbeing of older 
people and ageing populations. The project aims to facilitate proactive decision making about the 
future of transport in New Zealand. A summary document covering the wider content of the project 
to date is available (Fitt et al., 2018). 
Transport needs and other features of society—including population demographics, urban form, 
human activities, technology developments, and social connections—have evolved together in 
complex ways over time (Docherty, Marsden, & Anable, 2017; Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012). 
Going forwards, we can expect further changes. Some changes—like an ageing population—are 
broadly predictable because they are extensions of current trends. Others are much less certain. 
Even where we can have a reasonable degree of confidence about some changes, the complex 
interconnections between features and dynamics of social life make it impossible to predict our 
future world in accurate detail.  
Even though we cannot predict the future, we can consider possibilities with a view to preparing for 
the likely, planning for the preferable, and avoiding the undesirable. In this document we talk about 
plausible futures. That is, things that could happen but about which we cannot be certain. In doing 
so, we hope to prompt discussion and therefore decision-making that is informed and proactive, 
even as it acknowledges the uncertainties of the future. 
This document starts with some brief background on the development of AV technology, continues 
on to detail the development of our future scenarios, and finishes with four thought-provoking 
narratives, each telling a very different story about what New Zealand’s transport system could look 
like in 2048.  
Autonomous vehicle technology 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are increasingly expected to be part of future transport systems. A wide 
range of vehicle manufacturers and technology companies is investing large sums of money in 
developing vehicles with commercial potential. Governments around the world have begun putting 
in place provisions for the use of such vehicles on public roads. Eventual widespread use of such 
vehicles is not certain, and there are challenges still to be overcome in domains including 
technology, but also public acceptance and domestic and international law. 
We use ‘autonomous vehicles’ as something of a catch-all term. We acknowledge, however, that 
vehicles can be equipped with a range of different autonomous features, from assisted braking or 
steering, through to technologies that can perform all driving tasks without the involvement of a 
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human driver. SAE International has developed a classification scheme to facilitate the development 
of a common terminology for vehicle automation (SAE International, 2016). We refer to this 
classification when we need to be specific about the kind of automation we are discussing. Box 1.1 
provides a simplified version of the classification 
system. When we refer to ‘low automation’, we 
are referring to Levels 1 and 2 automation; ‘high 
automation’ (or to ‘highly autonomous vehicle’ or 
‘HAV’) refers to Level 5 automation. We avoid the 
term ‘full automation’ (although this is used to 
describe Level 5 vehicles in the SAE International 
classification) because ‘full’ implies that future 
automation could not proceed beyond what is 
currently envisaged. We leave open the possibility 
that further levels of automation could be 
developed, perhaps including dynamic destination 
selection responsive to connections with other 
devices, such as refrigerators connected through 
the Internet Of Things (IOT).  
A large number of vehicle tests and trials is 
currently underway (Bloomberg Philanthropies, 
2017) and a number of producers are racing to 
develop HAVs for commercial availability. 
Estimates of the timeframe over which we might 
see HAVs come to constitute a substantial 
proportion of the vehicle fleet vary widely. Some 
commentators suggest that a majority of vehicles 
in circulation could be highly autonomous as early 
as 2030; more conservative estimates consider 
widespread adoption more likely to have occurred by around 2060 (cf. Bansal, Kockelman, & Singh, 
2016; Clark, Parkhurst, & Ricci, 2016; Haratsis, 2016; Kanter, 2015; Litman, 2017). Clark et al. (2016) 
and Litman (2017) provide more complete reviews of timeframe estimates.  
Later, we present some scenarios exploring possible transport systems in the year 2048. We chose 
2048 for a number of reasons, including that some of the stakeholders in our project (with whom we 
discussed the scenarios) advised it was not so far in the future as to be difficult to relate to or to 
imagine. Also, 30 years from now people who are currently middle aged (including many of New 
Zealand’s decision makers) will be in older age brackets; this age group is the one with the most 
strongly entrenched driving habit. Some of our scenarios include fleets comprised almost entirely of 
HAVs. We acknowledge that 2048 provides an ambitious timeframe for technology adoption but 
argue that pushing boundaries a little is appropriate in a document that is intended to prompt 
thought and discussion.  
Our scenarios focus on autonomous passenger vehicles. We acknowledge several related 
technologies that are likely to influence future transport systems but which, in the interests of 
brevity, we exclude from our primary focus. For example, we do not devote significant attention to 
Box 1.1: Levels of automation 
Level 0 – vehicles with no automation 
Level 1 – vehicles with either assisted 
steering or assisted acceleration and 
deceleration 
Level 2 – vehicles with both assisted 
steering and assisted acceleration and 
deceleration 
Level 3 – vehicles that can drive themselves 
in some circumstances but require a human 
driver to be available to retake control if 
necessary 
Level 4 – vehicles that can drive themselves 
in some circumstances without a human 
driver 
Level 5 – vehicles that can drive themselves 
in all situations that a human driver could 
be expected to manage (HAVs) 




freight vehicles, to vehicle connectivity, or to non-land based vehicles such as drones. Freight 
operations may provide early opportunities for routine use of AVs, and such use could have 
widespread social implications including for the future of work, for consumption behaviours, and for 
traffic management.  
Connected vehicles are equipped with 
technology that allows wireless data 
transfer between vehicles (known as V2V 
communication), between vehicles and 
infrastructure (V2I communication), or 
between a vehicle and any entity that may 
affect it (vehicle to everything, or V2X, 
communication). Such communications 
could assist in vehicle safety, vehicle 
efficiency, and automatic vehicle routing; 
all of which could have socially significant 
impacts. Aerial transport technologies 
(targeted at the movement of both freight 
and passengers) are also being developed 
and tested around the world. Increases in 
aerial transport could radically transform 
urban environments and early 
consideration of its potential impacts 
would be prudent. While we acknowledge 
the significance of all of these potential 
changes to transport systems, our 
scenarios focus primarily on land-based, 
passenger vehicle automation.  
We assume that most future vehicles will 
be electrically powered. France, the UK, 
Norway, and China, and a number of 
vehicle manufacturers, have established 
targets or strategies to transition away 
from internal combustion only vehicles 
(Petroff, 2017; The Economist, 2017; 
Vaughan, 2017). Stakeholders in our 
research have argued that a continued 
dominance of combustion driven vehicles 
is unlikely and Wolmar (2018)  suggests 
electrification is a precondition for 
automation. We also note that a move to electrically powered vehicles will facilitate progress 
towards vehicle automation because it is technologically easier to produce an electric autonomous 
vehicle than one powered by an internal combustion engine.  
Box 1.2: A brief history of vehicle automation 
Vehicles that can drive themselves have been 
imagined at least since Leonardo da Vinci designed a 
self-propelled cart with ‘programmable’ steering 
around the turn of the 16th century (da-Vinci-
Inventions.com, 2008; Lorenzi, 2004). Subsequent 
developments, including vehicle motorisation and 
the use of cameras and radar, improved the 
performance of self-driving vehicles, but by the turn 
of the 21st century these were still far from practical 
transport solutions (Anderson et al., 2014). Then, in 
2004, the US Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) introduced the first of what was to 
be a series of high stakes competitions with the 
ultimate aim of developing autonomous vehicles 
that would be able to function successfully in 
hazardous military situations (DARPA, 2014). The 
first challenge was to complete a 142 mile driving 
course through the Mojave Desert; the highest 
placed competitor completed only 7.5 miles of the 
course (DARPA, 2014). This and subsequent 
challenges did, however, result in an increased 
impetus to solve some of the problems of 
autonomous driving, and in collaborations and co-
operations that brought together experts with a 
range of complementary skills (Anderson et al., 
2014; DARPA, 2014). By the third, and final, DARPA 
challenge in 2007, six teams had developed vehicles 
that were able to complete a 60 mile urban course, 
avoiding other vehicles and obeying traffic 
regulations (DARPA, 2014). That success heralded 
increasingly concerted attempts to produce an 
autonomous vehicle that could be used in everyday 




2) Developing future transport scenarios 
Scenarios can help us to think about the future from different perspectives. A common scenario 
development technique is to use key (global and local) drivers to inform the construction of what 
Shergold, Lyons, and Hubers (2015) term a ‘double uncertainty matrix’ (see also Banister & Hickman, 
2013). The double uncertainty matrix consists of two axes portraying the extents of uncertainty in 
two dimensions. Placing the axes in a cross formation leaves four possibility quadrants with different 
characteristics. The identification of different sets of characteristics allows the development of a 
scenario for each quadrant. This technique has been used by the New Zealand Ministry of Transport. 
For example, in the Future Demand exercise, Lyons et al. (2014) considered the potential 
implications of two possible social dynamics: changing energy costs relative to incomes and living 
costs, and differing social preferences for virtual or face-to-face connections. The resulting double 
uncertainty matrix and scenario outlines are shown in Figure 2.1. In a more recent exercise, the 
Ministry of Transport has modelled changes in trips, mode share, and distances travelled for four 
scenarios based around accessibility preference (physical compared to virtual) and uptake of 
autonomous vehicle technologies (Ministry of Transport, 2017). The report also models the health 
benefits (in terms of active travel) from modal shift, but does not consider wider health and 
wellbeing implications. 
 
Figure 2.1: Ministry of Transport Future Demand scenarios.  
Source: The Ministry of Transport and licensed by the Ministry of Transport for re-use under the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International (BY) Licence. (Lyons et al., 2014) 
Key drivers 
The definition of the axes for a double uncertainty matrix requires the identification of key drivers. In 
this project we considered the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental 
(PESTLE) drivers of possible changes to our transport systems. In conducting and presenting this 
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analysis we acknowledge that the world is enormously complex and it is well beyond the current 
scope to catalogue all possible drivers of future transport systems. However, PESTLE analysis 
provides a framework for analysing a complex range of factors that may influence future systems 
(see Liggett, Frame, Gilbert, and Morgan (2017) and Sridhar et al. (2016) for further examples of 
‘PESTLE’ analyses). Here we highlight those drivers we think are most critical to our focus on future 
transport systems as well as those most commonly drawn out in the literature reviewed. We also 
acknowledge that drivers are interdependent. While they are presented as essentially discrete 
categories of influence below, we note that, for example, political, economic, legal, and social 
dynamics are intricately entwined and interdependent.  
Political 
One of the key current drivers of autonomous vehicle technology is interest from a range of 
powerful actors, including national and local governments. Governmental support for autonomous 
vehicle trials and adoption is evident in a range of jurisdictions and is responsive to a range of 
different subsidiary policy drivers, many of them economic. For example, the current US 
administration is pursuing a light regulatory approach prioritising national economic competitiveness 
and rapid innovation (though critics contend that voluntary guidelines may not be adequate to 
protect public safety) (NHTSA, 2017; Zanona, 2017). At the same time, Singapore couples promotion 
of an innovative technology sector with a focus on moving towards a ‘car-lite environment’ and was 
first in the world to launch a public trial of autonomous taxis (McSpadden, 2016; Meng, 2017). The 
European Union is pursuing strategies responding to the market potential of automated vehicles 
(European Commission, 2016). Similarly, the UK government is targeting economic growth from a 
prioritisation of autonomous vehicle technology, and may be at an advantage compared to many of 
its European competitors having not ratified the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, which 
essentially requires a vehicle to have a human driver (Tovey, 2016).1 The UK has set up a Future 
Cities Catapult initiative to act as a bridge between industry and academia, and has provided 
research funding to explore AV technologies (Moss, 2015). Not all governments are optimistic about 
the potential of autonomous vehicles and India’s road transport and highways minister was recently 
reported as saying “We won’t allow driverless cars in India. I am very clear on this” (Das Gupta, 
2017). Increasingly the expectation that vehicle automation will happen regardless of any nation’s 
domestic strategy seems likely to influence supportive policy directions.  
Potential risks related to terrorism and cyber-crime may, however, have a dampening effect on 
political enthusiasm for vehicle automation; these risks are covered in more detail in the Social and 
Technological driver sections. Major high risk, low probability events (such as large scale war or 
devastating pandemics) are beyond the scope of our work, but any given consideration could be 
incorporated into an extension of this project.  
Economic 
Clearly, many of the political drivers for an adoption of autonomous vehicles are economically 
motivated. Indeed the European Commission expects that the market potential of autonomous 
vehicles and associated service industries could reach dozens of billions of Euros annually (European 
Commission, 2016). The commercial potential is also providing strong encouragement to technology 
                                                          
1 The UK did, however, ratify the earlier Geneva Convention and is still bound by some (looser) restrictions on 
vehicle drivers and the Vienna Convention was updated in 2014 to allow some concessions to automation 
technology (Bradshaw-Martin & Easton, 2014). 
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companies, the automobile industry, and associated entities (Docherty et al., 2017). The large 
investments being made in this space by companies including Waymo (formerly the Google self-
driving car project), Tesla, Uber, Ford, GM, Volkswagen, and Volvo indicate potential gains. Economic 
gains are likely to continue to drive powerful corporations towards automation technology.  
The economic drivers of autonomous vehicle consumption are much less clear than those guiding 
technology development. It is very commonly argued that, in an autonomous future, consumers will 
be less likely to purchase a vehicle, instead accessing vehicles through car sharing services. Car 
sharing has been increasing in popularity over recent decades and is estimated to have between one 
and two million users worldwide (Le Vine, Lee-Gosselin, Sivakumar, & Polak, 2014; Shaheen & 
Cohen, 2013). This has happened in the context of shifts in the economic models that allow access to 
goods and services (Belk, 2014; Botsman & Rogers, 2010; Sundararajan, 2016). Facilitated by Web 
2.0 technologies, increased computing power, and online systems, services like TradeMe, Airbnb, 
Uber, Cityhop, and SHAREaCAMPER have emerged (Botsman & Rogers, 2010). New economic 
models connect demand and supply across large populations, permit distributed real-time 
transactions, and allow strangers to engage in trust-based interactions. Some argue that new 
economic models are already fundamentally changing the shape of economic transactions and will 
continue to do so, to a greater and greater extent, as they become more sophisticated and more 
prevalent (Botsman & Rogers, 2010; Sundararajan, 2016).  
Increases in car sharing may be driven by cost and convenience. The per-trip costs of owning a 
vehicle are high, especially if the costs of at-home parking (including garaging), cleaning, and 
maintenance are included (Le Vine et al., 2014; Litman, 2017). Car share schemes (whether 
commercial, peer-to-peer, or hybrid) can spread overheads amongst users thereby considerably 
reducing per-trip costs. Vehicles that incorporate sophisticated automation technology are likely (at 
least initially) to have higher purchase and maintenance costs, thus increasing the benefits of sharing 
schemes. In addition, current users of car sharing schemes have to travel to the—variably 
convenient—parked location of a shared vehicle (Dowling & Kent, 2015). In contrast, autonomous 
vehicles could travel to a requested pick-up point, thus substantially increasing the convenience of 
vehicle sharing. Together, the reduced cost and increased convenience of autonomous vehicle 
sharing, alongside broader shifts towards new economic models, could lead to a transformation in 
vehicle and travel consumption. This possible transformation underlies many of the claims 
commonly made about the potential benefits of autonomous vehicles (such as their benefits for 
older people and for the environment) and is likely to be a key influence on dynamics associated 
with the wellbeing of older adults.  
Our scenarios take account of possible changes to economic models of car use. Though feasible, 
other major economic disruptions are beyond our scope but could be incorporated into future 
scenarios. 
Social 
Social drivers of future transport systems can include changes in societal views, preferences, and 
needs, and changes in the demographic make-up of society. As generations age, preferences for 
travel, amongst other things are likely to change (Curl et al., 2018). For example, much attention is 
currently being paid to the reduced level of car ownership among younger people (e.g. Chatterjee et 
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al., 2018) – who will be the older generation of the future . It important to consider the implications 
of demographic shifts.  
Preferences for shared travel or independent travel will evolve alongside models of vehicle 
ownership and use. Recent research indicates a preference for sharing services that do not require 
social interaction between users (International Transport Forum, 2017a, 2017b). Economic models 
of collaboration mediated through the internet (such as TradeMe, Airbnb, and Uber) are growing in 
popularity, but increases in online collaboration may not translate into increasing preferences for 
face-to-face interactions. This could drive futures in which any ride sharing services that exist consist 
of vehicles designed for minimal social interaction between users. Wider preferences for face-to-
face compared to virtual connection are considered in more detail in (Lyons et al., 2014). 
Other (largely non-economic) social preferences could further influence dynamics around car use 
and ownership. Cars and driving are widely regarded as carriers of strong social meanings, including 
adulthood, status, freedom, independence, masculinity, professional accomplishment, and social 
group membership (see for example Bergstad et al., 2011; Gatersleben, 2011; Griskevicius, Tybur, & 
Van den Bergh, 2010; Sachs, 1992; Steg, 2005; Stokes & Hallett, 1992; Urry, 2000; Watson, 1996). 
Although individuals may sometimes behave as rational economic actors (making decisions based on 
cost and convenience) they are also influenced by social meanings and social norms. Meanings and 
norms can change, and advocates of the concept of ‘peak car’ suggest that car ownership and 
driving are losing some of their social importance. However, these social dynamics are still strong 
drivers of transport practices. These drivers currently provide pressure towards personal car 
ownership and the acquisition of driving skills (Fitt, 2016). 
Societal concerns around data sharing practices could also help shape future transport systems. 
Some of the stakeholders with whom we have discussed our scenarios have argued that data 
privacy, storage, ownership, and use concerns are more likely than concerns about vehicle operation 
to impede widespread uptake of AV technology. This might be especially so for older adults. EU 
autonomous vehicle policy has a particular focus on privacy issues and specifies that data uses must 
comply with strict data protection laws (European Commission, 2016). Societies’ attitudes towards 
privacy and sharing will inform commercial operations, government policy, legislation, and the 
technical specifications of vehicles and their data uses.  
Beyond privacy and data sharing, concerns around terrorism and vehicle hacking may become strong 
social currents. Technology developers will need to earn consumer trust if autonomous vehicles are 
to be widely adopted, especially if high levels of vehicle connectivity make entire vehicle systems 
vulnerable. Society may be less willing to accept these new risks, than to accept the established and 
familiar risks associated with human error (McKinney, 2017). 
Technological 
Current debates around AV adoption feature concerns about the levels of automation that will be 
publicly available at different points in time. Some manufacturers (including Audi, Tesla, BMW, and 
GM) currently appear to expect to move sequentially through the levels of vehicle automation, 
incrementally increasing their autonomous capabilities. Other manufacturers (including Volvo, Ford, 
Waymo, and Mercedes) have expressed concerns about levels of automation (and specifically Level 
3 automation) that require a human driver to retake control of a vehicle if required (Auto2x, 2017; 
Ayre, 2017; Gain, 2017). At the time of writing, there is a lack of consensus around preferred 
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trajectories through levels of automation, however, consensus does appear to be increasingly 
leaning towards an avoidance of Level 3 automation. It is also worth noting a considerable degree of 
scepticism amongst stakeholders that autonomous vehicles will be able to deal with all road 
conditions (including extreme weather and rural roads of variable standards) in the near to medium 
term future. Most stakeholders argue that highly autonomous vehicles will initially only operate in a 
narrow range of circumstances. This means that the vehicle fleet is highly likely to remain mixed 
even in high automation scenarios. 
Legal 
There are numerous legal issues associated with adoption of AVs; revisions to domestic and 
international legislation will be prerequisites for widespread uptake.  
Complex legal issues associated with AVs include how to determine and apportion accident liability 
between an autonomous vehicle user, vehicle supplier, software manufacturer, and software 
installer; how to assess liability and damages when an autonomous vehicle is in a collision with a 
non-autonomous vehicle (or indeed when two vehicles with different levels of autonomy or different 
software configurations collide); and whether changes to (or potentially abolition of) driver licencing 
laws are required. These issues may have different implications in different legal jurisdictions, for 
instance New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) may simplify liability issues 
compared particularly to the more litigious approach of the United States (Ministry of Transport, 
2009). Issues around insurance and liability are discussed in more detail in Fletcher, Fitt, Baldwin, 
Hadfield, and Curl (2018). It is unlikely that widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles will be 
possible in New Zealand without widespread adoption elsewhere (largely because of the size of the 
New Zealand vehicle market and its appeal to international vehicle producers). This means that 
legislation enacted in other jurisdictions will have a key impact on future transport systems in New 
Zealand.  
Laws restrict the activities that can be undertaken, but are relatively responsive to underlying social, 
political, economic, and technological conditions. There are many examples of laws being updated in 
response to changing circumstances; recent New Zealand examples include the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015, the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, and even 
changes to maximum speed limits on some roads introduced in 2017 (NZ Transport Agency, 2017). 
Internationally, there are also examples of laws already being introduced or adjusted in response to 
autonomous vehicle technology. For example, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic was 
updated in 2014 to allow some concessions to automation technology (Bradshaw-Martin & Easton, 
2014). Germany has passed these changes into domestic law (Gesley, 2016), and in the United 
States, the National Conference of State Legislatures has developed the Autonomous Vehicles 
Legislative Database (NCSL, 2017) to help keep track of legislative changes across different US 
jurisdictions. It seems likely, then, that legal requirements may slow any adoption of autonomous 
vehicles (perhaps considerably in the case of some of the particularly challenging ethical issues, 
which are discussed in more detail in (Fletcher et al., 2018)) but that laws will respond to, rather 
than fundamentally drive, developments in future transport systems. 
Environmental  
Moves towards autonomous electric vehicles could have substantial environmental benefits. Electric 
vehicles have lower emissions than internal combustion alternatives, and AVs operate more 
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efficiently than human driven vehicles . The potential environmental benefits of these moves are 
drivers of technology adoption, for example, the European Union explicitly links issues of smart 
mobility to climate policy through its climate emissions reduction policy (European Union, n/d). 
Environmental motives may also drive moves towards a sharing economy from the perspectives 
both of consumers and of public sector agencies developing facilitating policy or legislation 
(Botsman & Rogers, 2010). Expectations of vehicle sharing in turn underlie many of the presumed 
environmental (and social) benefits of AV technologies. It is possible that an increasing visibility of 
the effects of climate change could lead to increasing scrutiny of the environmental credentials of 
different transport system configurations. Currently, however, the other drivers discussed above 
appear to be having more influence on planning and decision making with regard to AV 
technologies.  
Future transport scenarios 
We reviewed the drivers detailed above for their significance for transport systems, and especially 
for their significance for an ageing population. We found two dynamics to be of particular interest.  
The level of automation that might be prevalent in future transport systems is interesting for two 
reasons.  First, there are competing factors driving alternatively towards high or low automation. 
Figure 2.3 provides a simplified illustration of the directions in which some of the key factors 
discussed above may drive transport systems. Second, research team brainstorming exercises 
suggested that the levels of automation in transport systems might have particular relevance for 
urban form and older people. For example, for older adults who cannot drive, the difference 
between Level 3 automation (which automates the driving task in some circumstances but still 
requires a human driver) and Level 5 automation might be the difference between transport 
exclusion and transport inclusion.  
New economic models that might influence how cars are accessed and used are also particularly 
interesting in the context of future transport systems. There is considerable evidence that economic 
systems have been changing in recent years with the emergence of new kinds of transactions with a 
growing influence on interactions between people, and between people and assets (e.g. Paypal, 
Bitcoin). We have also seen the development, proliferation, and popularisation of different ways of 
accessing travel, including schemes such as  commercial car-share (e.g. Zipcar and Cityhop), peer to 
peer vehicle-sharing (e.g. Yourdrive and SHAREaCamper), ride-hailing (e.g. Uber and Lyft), and ride-
sharing (e.g. local carpooling arrangements). The mobility schemes of some automotive 
companies—not entirely successful to date, but still evolving—, such as Ford’s failed Credit Link 
programme in which a self-organised group of people could share a car lease, is an example of this 
new mobility trend. There are also experiments with on-demand, door-to-door public transport, and 
other schemes such as Mobility as a Service (MaaS) that facilitate multi-modal travel (for example, 
using a combination of public transport and bike share). It is far from certain whether vehicle 
ownership will prevail as a dominant way of accessing transport into the future. New economic 
models for transport access could have profound implications for how cities work and for the 
mobility of older people. In addition, these changes could play out quite differently depending on 
different levels of automation. For example, the costs of providing on-demand, door-to-door public 
transport could reduce substantially if automation negated the need to pay driver wages.  
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The identification of two dynamics that are of particular relevance to future transport systems and 
older people allows the development of a double uncertainty matrix. 
The dimensions of uncertainty selected are: 
1. The levels of automation included in future transport systems 
2. The economic models on which future transport systems are based 









For ease of reference to traditional and new economic models we follow Botsman and Rogers (2010) 
in using the terms ‘hyper consumption’ and ‘collaborative consumption’. Botsman and Rogers (2010) 
describe hyper consumption as being defined by individual ownership and facilitated by advertising 
and easy availability of credit. In contrast, collaborative consumption is defined by shared access and 
is facilitated by reputation and community building. Other definitions have been put forward for 
new economic models and there is currently no consensus on which is most appropriate to future 
transport systems (Sundararajan, 2016). In-depth definitions often share features like the use of 
internet technology, the optimisation of underused assets, and the development of trust 
mechanisms (Sundararajan, 2016). Differences commonly feature the extent to which services are 
commercially driven, the involvement of corporations and/or peer-to-peer interaction, and 
differences in geographical scales (Sundararajan, 2016). Differences in definitions are accompanied 
by a diversifying portfolio of terms including the ‘collaborative economy’, the ‘sharing economy’, 
‘crowd-based capitalism’, ‘gig economy’, ‘peer economy’, ‘renting economy’, and ‘on-demand 
economy’ (Sundararajan, 2016).  
Figure 2.3 demonstrates how the drivers outlined above may influence outcomes with regard to 
these two axes of uncertainty. Note that the number of arrows pointing in each direction is not 
necessarily an indication of probability as some drivers will be stronger than others and the relative 
strength (and direction) of drivers could change over time. This figure is simply an illustration of 









We used workshops, discussion, and stakeholder consultation to devise four scenarios that inhabit 
the four possibility quadrants between the two uncertainty axes as shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4: Possible NZ transport systems (2048) 
Narratives describing each scenario in detail are provided below. Note that these scenarios are not 
an attempt to predict what will happen or to indicate which possibilities might be preferable; they 
are designed to be plausible possibilities that will trigger discussion and proactive responses and that 




In the New Zealand of Custom Cocoons, almost everyone owns their own 
driverless car.  
Now that cars drive themselves more safely than humans ever could, most people have 
given up driving and have enthusiastically embraced the freedom and safety that 
autonomous vehicles provide. Most people have their own individualized cocoon available 
at a moment’s notice. Just say the word or use the app and your virtual PA will summon 
your cocoon to come and find you, wherever you are.   
Some people choose cheap and cheerful cocoons, others choose the heights of luxury; it’s 
entirely up to you…but remember that you can’t just buy your cocoon and forget about it. 
You’ll need to pay for software updates (which are more expensive for luxury models) and 
insurance (which is actually cheaper for high quality cocoons). It’s a tricky balancing act, 
but if your cocoon isn’t up to date, smart infrastructure embedded in the road network 
will immobilise it…and then you won’t be going anywhere fast. 
Getting around 
Most of us go pretty much everywhere in our cocoons, it’s just so easy and 
convenient. There’s not much public transport anymore and virtually nobody 
used it anyway, especially once children started to get their own cocoons. 
Some people do still walk and cycle for leisure and exercise, and biking is 
almost totally safe now that vehicles are programmed to avoid collisions. Most 
people agree that increased safety is a good thing (though, paradoxically, public sensitivity 
to risk has increased as actual road safety has improved).  
In the early days of cocoons pedestrians quickly realised that they didn’t have to look for 
crossings any more, or even really pay attention when crossing the road. They just walked 
out, and expected the cocoons to stop...which they did. That got pretty annoying pretty 
quickly for the people in the cocoons and it didn’t take long for walking or cycling on or 
near roads to be generally considered antisocial, earning it the nickname ‘punking’. Now 
you get an automatic fine if one of your mobile devices is detected on a road but not in a 
vehicle.  This has pretty much stopped punking, but it does mean that if you want to cross 
a road, you have to find a designated crossing point. Most people find crossings too far 
apart to make actually getting anywhere on foot or by bike practical; it’s cocoons all the 
way. 
 
Cities and towns 
Our cities and towns are busy places, full of roads packed with cocoons whizzing people 
around. ‘Zombie cars’ even drive themselves in endless holding patterns to avoid parking 
charges. Cities have expanded outwards over recent years as more and more space is 
taken up by roads and more and more people move outwards in an ever-expanding 
search for peace and quiet. If you look at our city at night, it’s a strangely beautiful mass of 
ever-moving lights.  
Health and wellbeing 
Most of us agree that not having the stress of driving anymore is a good thing. On the 
other hand, now we go pretty much everywhere in cocoons, we don’t get much exercise. 
Some people are starting to take fitness pills to compensate for the lack of exercise, but 
we’re really not sure what the long term effects of those are and a lot of people are quite 
sceptical about the benefits.   
The biggest wellbeing challenges are probably for those people who can’t 
afford their own cocoon. With essential services a long way apart, and 
communities cut in two by roads you can’t cross without getting fined, it can be 
really difficult to manage without a cocoon. The government does provide 
some taxi subsidies for those without their own cocoon, but those barely cover 
the costs of essential travel. It’s really much better to have your own cocoon.  
Government policy 
Our government tries not to interfere too much in the free operation of markets. There 
has been some concern recently about people trying to hack cocoons for disruptive or 
nefarious purposes and some commentators have suggested legislation on software 
standards; it seems more likely that our government will prefer to encourage software 
developers to compete for consumer trust by producing more and more hackproof 
systems.  
The downside of encouraging software developers to compete is that vehicles all operate 
on different systems, unable to take advantage of some of the connectivity that is possible 
in theory. For example, our cocoons can’t drive close together in high speed platoons that 
could reduce traffic congestion and increase fuel efficiency. We’re pretty lucky though 




Mode nomads whizz around this New Zealand in driverless vehicles, often 
switching to walking and cycling in dense urban areas. 
To understand our New Zealand, you have to understand caps, capzones, and KiwiNet. 
‘Caps’ are automated travel capsules; they come in a variety of sizes and configurations 
and they can travel on any part of the transport network. The transport network is divided 
into capzones and streets. ‘Capzones’ are where caps work best; these are high speed 
corridors where there is nothing to impede fast travel. Globally, the first capzones 
replaced motorways and freeways, and then increasingly they also replaced other main 
thoroughfares. In capzones, caps platoon automatically, taking advantage of the efficiency 
gains of travelling in closely packed convoys. Caps join and leave the capzones in carefully 
(but automatically) choreographed merging patterns to minimise efficiency losses.  
Streets are very different to capzones; these are shared spaces where caps coexist with 
cyclists, pedestrians, and playing children. Historic distinctions between vehicle lanes and 
footpaths are obsolete and space is openly shared. Children learn about the 
concept of jaywalking in history lessons at school; the idea of organised 
pedestrian crossings usually prompts gales of laughter. In streets, caps travel 
very slowly, weaving their way between other street users and giving way 
often. Most people only use caps on streets if they’re not in a hurry, if they 
can’t walk or cycle, or if the weather is truly atrocious.  
KiwiNet is the brain of our transport network, it’s managed through blockchain technology 
and it keeps the whole system running smoothly. The public face of KiwiNet is a single app 
that can be used to summon a cap, find a shared bike, or work out the best route to walk, 
skate, or hoverblade to your destination.  
Most of the caps (and shared bikes) managed by KiwiNet are actually owned by non-
profits or social enterprises and KiwiNet sets ride prices dynamically according to 
parameters like distance, congestion management, and the sustainability of vehicle 
provision and maintenance. Citizens have KiwiNet accounts from which all their travel 
costs (including cap or bicycle use) are automatically deducted. 
Getting around 
It doesn’t take a genius to work out how we get around. If we’re going any distance, we 
use the capzones; for shorter journeys most of us prefer active travel because it’s quicker 
and much cheaper (especially in peak travel hours). Most people give KiwiNet auto-access 
to their calendars and it plans their travel according to their preferences and (if needed) it 
can provide livestream instructions while they are travelling. 
You could probably count on one hand the number of times in a year that a pedestrian or 
cyclist gets hit by a cap. Usually when that happens, it’s because drunk students have 
been actively trying to trick a cap into hitting them. When they do get hit, it’s usually just a 
couple of bruises and a lot of ‘likes’ on their social media livecast. 
Cities and towns 
Our streets are bustling with life. Alongside pedestrians and cyclists, are also pop-up 
markets, neighbourhood deckchair movie nights, and kids' fun days. When an event is on, 
caps will just be directed another way, or will pick their way through at a snail’s pace. 
Rural townships are more connected than ever to cities as KiwiNet uses capzones to 
create high speed corridors to connect the outlying towns to the bigger cities. 
At night, capzones and streets are used by caps for goods deliveries, but caps still give way 
to other users on streets. Night time crime levels have dropped as the 
constantly moving vehicles give the impression of always being watched. 
Health and wellbeing 
One of our government’s most strongly held beliefs is that access to facilities is 
a social right. As all travel costs are managed by KiwiNet, it’s pretty 
straightforward for the government to provide credit for people with low 
incomes or with impairments that restrict how they can travel.  
Beneficiaries have complete control over how they spend the credit but, of course, there 
are support and planning services for those how struggle to manage their travel budget.  
Government policy 
Although there are still some cars around that require human drivers, their use is 
considered dangerous, is illegal in most situations, and is primarily restricted to historical 
events and specifically-zoned recreational opportunities. 
Regulation requires all caps to operate through KiwiNet and, beyond the public face of its 
app, KiwiNet manages traffic flows in the capzones, ensures hardware and software 
quality and standardisation for caps, calculates road use levies, and performs all the 
essential functions of a transport system. Government blockchain specialists have 
ultimate oversight of KiwiNet.   
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In this New Zealand, citizens are Active Scouts, seeking out the best ways 
to travel and using a variety of different options. 
A few years ago, engineers assumed that by now we would all be zipping around in 
driverless cars. What they didn’t count on was the backlash to perceived abuses of 
consumer privacy and the strong public reaction to early fatalities. Global consumer 
mistrust meant people weren’t willing to accept vehicles they felt were constantly 
watching them and where they couldn’t retake control…and after briefly playing with cars 
where you could hover your hands over the steering wheel and retake control if 
necessary, most people decided that paying attention to not-driving was a lot harder than 
just driving the car.  
Most people don’t own cars anymore though; it’s just too expensive when you take things 
like tax and parking costs into account. We use car share schemes to hire a vehicle when 
we need one. There are several really good travel apps that facilitate car sharing, but 
more and more people are moving to the most popular app, Swoosh.  
Swoosh’s strategy was to dominate the market for corporate vehicle fleets. 
Once your employer uses Swoosh you have to get a Swoosh profile, and now 
lots of us have employment contracts that require us to maintain our sharing 
reputation on Swoosh. Once you’re doing that for work anyway, you might as 
well use the discount benefits of a strong reputation for your personal trips as 
well (although sometimes using one service for everything does feel a bit big-brotherish).  
These days, it’s pretty common to actively pick the best way to make each trip. For routine 
trips we all have our preferred options, but we often change what we do because of the 
weather, or because of side-trips, or even because we just feel like doing something 
different. Swoosh is always on hand to help us make choices between the available 
options and to make paying for them simple.  
Most people pay for all their travel through Swoosh. You can get unlimited public 
transport with an ‘UP’ pass, but each time you use a car, money is deducted from your 
account to pay per-trip taxes. That makes car travel seem a lot more expensive than public 
transport so lots of people only drive when they’ve got a big load or are going out of the 
way.   
Public transport is really popular. The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems in all the cities are 
excellent and high levels of investment and use are allowing for more and more routes 
and more and more frequent services to be added. We also walk and bike a lot and doing 
so has got much safer since the apps allowed users of all travel modes to downrate a 
driver’s reputation. Drivers are much more courteous now they know bad behaviour 
damages reputation. Bike share schemes are also popular, and they connect well with all 
the public transport facilities so that makes it super-easy to get around without needing to 
get a car.  
Cities and towns 
Our cities are densely packed but don’t have the levels of congestion that they used to 
before the BRT investments. They also have lots of green space now that most of the 
parking has been removed to discourage car use and make our cities nicer places to be. 
Most of us like to live fairly close to the places we go often and it’s pretty rare for us to 
travel all the way across town. That said, residential areas near to BRT routes are popular 
because they do provide that extra flexibility in terms of getting around.  
Health and wellbeing 
Our cities are pretty nice places to be, they’re dense, but they have plenty of 
green spaces and most of us can access all the things we need locally. We get 
plenty of exercise and wellbeing in urban areas is at an all-time high.  
People with special mobility needs or low incomes can access free UP passes, 
which give them pretty good mobility. Some people argue that they should get 
free access to cars too, but given the government’s attempts to deter car use that seems 
unlikely to happen. Admittedly, relying on public transport does place some restrictions 
on where you can live, but these are reducing as BRT and other transit networks grow.  
Government policy 
Our government tries to take a responsible approach to manageing the costs that vehicles 
impose on other people and on the environment. Vehicle taxes and parking charges are 
high, and construction of parking is restricted.   
We have some complex regulations that encourage businesses to collaborate but 
discourage collusion. This can cause headaches for those negotiating trade deals but we 
are also, in some respects, considered a world leader that others aspire to follow.  
At the moment, there is some concern about market domination by Swoosh and whether 
we need legislation to prevent a monopoly and subsequent rises in travel prices. We’re 
not sure how this one’s going to play out, but pretty much everyone has an opinion.  
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In the New Zealand of Amped Autos, people love to drive; so much so 
that motor-racing is the national sport. 
If you’ve ever experienced the thrill of taking racing turns through quiet mountain roads 
then you can probably feel what drives our love of cars and driving. Yes, carmakers flirted 
with driverless cars, and they managed to make them practical…but it was only after all 
that effort that they realised that our love of cars isn’t just about practicality. We love cars 
because they feel good, and no amount of effort can make a passive passenger feel like a 
driver.  
It was a few decades ago now that there were moves to try to get us sharing cars more 
and owning them less, but the scale of this shift and the time required to achieve it fully 
were too overwhelming for governments that institutionally focus on short-termism and 
the next election cycle.  Moreover, when you own a car you can make it your own (that’s 
why they call it ‘ownership’); you get to know its little quirks and idiosyncrasies (which is 
important if you want to drive it well), you can leave your stuff in it, and you 
don’t have to deal with the brown banana skin that the last user left in the 
passenger footwell. 
Also, of course, the car companies weren’t that impressed by the idea of selling 
fewer cars, and the sharing models on offer did not achieve the level of public 
buy-in or plausibility necessary to undercut the automotive industry’s power. 
Consequently, the major automobile companies continue to advertise driving as a 
fundamental human right (not that we need to be reminded) and they still encourage the 
provision of cheap credit for vehicle purchases. The auto industry also continues to 
vigorously protect itself from competition from new entrants, holding up Tesla’s early 
bankruptcy as an ongoing warning to those who try to sneak in to the market.  
Getting around 
We like driving, so we drive places. Of course, not everyone can drive but we’ve taken 
steps to ensure that anyone who is physically able to drive gets to do so. Driving and basic 
vehicle maintenance are compulsory subjects in schools and driving on public roads is 
legal from age 12. At the other end of our population, older drivers have to take a safety 
test at age 90 and every 10 years after that, but we know how important driving is to their 
independence so we do everything we can to keep them on the roads as long as possible.  
There isn’t much public transport provision these days and most people wouldn’t use it 
anyway; investing in something no-one uses would be a bit daft. Some people do walk and 
cycle for leisure, but that’s usually in the safety of rural off-road environments. Most of 
the on-road bike lanes that were built in the past have been taken out to allow more 
space for cars (and because it really wasn’t sensible to encourage people to bike on roads 
anyway). High speed electric bikes are popular with some of the older people who biked 
when they were younger, and they dominate off-road urban bike paths. Few children 
actually even learn to ride bikes these days and most progress directly from being driven 
by their parents to learning to drive themselves. 
Cities and towns 
Our roads are quite congested, but if you can afford to move out of the city a bit you can 
usually find somewhere that has good roads but isn’t too choked just yet. Some people do 
keep moving to stay just ahead of the congestion but if you move a good way out you can 
get quite a few years of peace and quiet before the traffic catches up with you.   
Parking in towns is a bit problematic, but malls in the outer suburbs mean you 
don’t have to deal with that unless you have a really specific reason to head for 
the centre. 
Health and wellbeing 
We live in a pretty equal society in that almost everyone can afford to drive. 
There are some people who can’t drive because they have some kind of physical or 
cognitive impairment though, and not driving is associated with considerable social 
stigma.  
There is some state-funded paratransit for people who can’t drive. It only covers ‘essential 
travel’ (which doesn’t include much) and it’s not very popular amongst users. It’s 
definitely better than nothing but it usually doesn’t allow those with impairments to work 
or to participate fully in the social and cultural lives of their communities.  
Government policy 
Our government prioritises economic growth and supports the large players in the auto 
industry. Regulation and taxes are low, because if they weren’t, industry would leave New 
Zealand for greener (less regulated) pastures oversees. Some people call this a ‘race to the 
bottom’ but our government prefers the term ‘economic pragmatism’
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3) Report summary and conclusions 
This research aims to facilitate decision making about the future of transport in New Zealand. This 
document specifically focuses on the examination of the four scenarios, which are narratives that 
are designed to trigger debate about plausible future transport systems. 
We have examined PESTLE (political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental) 
drivers that can influence two dimensions critical for the adoption of AVs: automation and 
consumption. This allowed to understand which factors can potentially promote or hinder higher 
automation and consumption. Further, we used workshops, discussion, and stakeholder 
consultation to develop four scenarios that inhabit the four possibility quadrants between the two 
uncertainty axes (automation and consumption). In result, we propose four scenarios: Custom 
Cocoons, Mode Nomads, Amped Autos, Active Scouts; 
which differ in their levels of automation and 
consumption.  
The scenarios may be more extreme than the reality that 
emerges. This was a deliberate choice because sometimes 
pushing beyond our everyday practical acceptance of the status quo encourages us to think about 
how things might be otherwise. Our scenarios, which were distinct from one another, internally 
consistent, and even somewhat homogenising of experiences, might belie the messiness of reality. 
For example, a double uncertainty matrix presents its extremes as mutually exclusive: automation is 
either high or low, it cannot be both. A situation in which highly automatous vehicles co-exist with 
driver controlled vehicles, and private car ownership and collaborative consumption complement 
each other in a multifaceted economic model, is highly plausible. In fact, we are confident that we 
will not witness the emergence of one new transport scenario or system. Instead we will see many 
subtly different variations emerging in different places and for different users. Between major 
disruptions—like the introduction of a new technology or a new economic model—transport 
systems will also continue to evolve, never really constituting an entirely stable scenario. 
 We have not and could not consider all the possible influences and drivers of future change. We 
recognise that there is a range of external influences to which we have not paid explicit attention. 
We have not considered changing climates, escalating 
electricity prices, global conflicts, stock market crashes, 
drones, hyperloop technology, or any of a myriad of other 
possibilities. We welcome readers to think about these 
and use the information we have presented to 
contemplate and discuss how other possibilities might 
work out.  
What we hope we have done more completely is to 
demonstrate that a transition to autonomous vehicles 
would not be just a technological transition; it would be a 
social one. While some research has focussed on what social change is needed to facilitate a 
transition to AVs (for example focusing on public acceptance of the technology or on the ethical and 
Fundamentally, we have 
to ask what kind of 
society we want to live 
in, and whether a given 
change might help us to 
get there. 
What does New Zealand 




legal challenges associated with it) there have been very limited considerations of what social 
changes might result. We have alluded to some possibilities—including changing social dynamics of 
communities and care—but there are many important questions that currently remain unexplored. 
Fundamentally, we have to ask what kind of society we want to live in, and whether a given change 
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